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Unbranding Confrontation as Only a Trial 
Right  
Shaakirrah R. Sanders* 
This Article challenges the oft-cited but unpersuasive rule that the Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause only applies at the trial stage of a “criminal prosecution.” I 
examine the most likely interpretation of the term “criminal prosecution” at the time of 
the Founding and conclude that the term would have included felony sentencing. I 
explore the Counsel Clause’s early rejection of the “trial-right-only” rule and the recent 
erosion of the “trial-right-only” rule with regard to the Jury Trial Clause in Alleyne v. 
United States. I advocate for eliminating the trial-right-only theory of the Confrontation 
Clause to allow cross-examination of testimonial statements that are material to 
punishment and where cross-examination assists in assessing truth and veracity. In such 
cases, I advocate a practical application of the fundamental right to confront witnesses 
during felony sentencing. Ultimately, I propose a uniform application of the Sixth 
Amendment’s structurally identical Counsel, Jury Trial, and Confrontation Clauses at 
felony sentencing. 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law. I would like to thank
participants of the 2013 Southeast/Southwest People of Color Conference, participants of the 
2013 Inland Northwest Junior Scholar’s Conference, and my colleagues at the University of Idaho 
College of Law for their review and critique of this work. 
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This is the second work in which I advocate for the extension of 
confrontation rights at felony sentencing hearings. In the first work, 
Making the Right Call for Confrontation at Felony Sentencing,1 I 
examined and challenged whether judicial authority existed in pre-
Founding felony cases to consider un-cross-examined testimony for 
purposes of fixing punishment. This Article examines and challenges 
another popular argument against confrontation at felony sentencing: that 
confrontation only applies at the trial stage of the “criminal prosecution.” 
The majority of the federal circuit courts that have examined the 
question of confrontation rights at felony sentencing have ruled that the 
Confrontation Clause is a right that only applies at trial.2 I reexamine this 
1. Shaakirrah R. Sanders, Making the Right Call for Confrontation at Felony Sentencing, 47 U.
Mich. J.L. Reform 791 (2014). 
2. See, e.g., United States v. Francis, 39 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a criminal
sentencing hearing is not within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment); United States v. Petty, 
982 F.2d 1365, 1367–70 (9th Cir. 1993) (agreeing that confrontation rights do not apply at sentencing), 
amended by 992 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1511 (6th Cir. 
1992) (en banc) (finding that confrontation is among those rights that are applicable at trial, but not 
sentencing); United States v. Tardiff, 969 F.2d 1283, 1287 (1st Cir. 1992) (“[A] defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to confront the witnesses . . . does not attach during the sentencing phase.”); United 
States v. Johnson, 935 F.2d 47, 50–52 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that cross-examination at sentencing is 
not required of probation officers regarding the substance of information included in the presentence 
report); United States v. Marshall, 910 F.2d 1241, 1244 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that hearsay is 
admissible for sentencing purposes); United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1180–81 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(distinguishing between rights at trial and rights at sentencing and concluding that confrontation rights 
do not apply at sentencing); United States v. Sunrhodes, 831 F.2d 1537, 1541 (10th Cir. 1987) 
(“Because restitution hearings are part of the sentencing process, [only] the Due Process Clause 
applies.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707, 711–12 (2d Cir. 1978) (“[M]ost of 
the information now relied upon by judges to guide them in the intelligent imposition of sentences 
would be unavailable if information were restricted to that given in open court by witnesses subject to 
cross-examination.”) (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250 (1949))). But see United States 
v. Fortier, 911 F.2d 100, 103–04 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that while there is a right to cross-examine
witnesses at criminal sentencing, the hearsay standard of reliability governs confrontation challenges), 
overruled by United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 400 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (“[P]rotections of the 
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approach and contribute to the scholarship surrounding the fundamental 
right of confrontation, arguing that this right should in fact extend through 
felony sentencing.3 
Although recent Confrontation Clause jurisprudence mandates 
cross-examination of testimonial statements at trial,4 those new rules do 
not apply for purposes of felony sentencing.5 However, the adversarial 
process does not end once a plea or verdict of guilt is rendered; it extends 
through felony sentencing. Testing the veracity of testimonial statements 
that are material to punishment is as compelling at felony sentencing as 
at trial, because felony sentencing courts have discretion to increase 
punishment based on un-cross-examined testimonial statements about 
several categories of unproven criminal conduct.6 Thus, such findings of 
fact are as qualitatively vital as those made during trial.7 Due to the 
current system of plea bargaining,8 the vast majority of felony defendants 
do not have the opportunity to test the veracity of testimonial statements 
made against them before the sentencing hearing. As such, the 
fundamental right to cross-examine a witness is unavailable at the most 
critical stage of the criminal prosecution: the sentencing hearing.9 
right of confrontation apply at the guilt phase, but it does not follow that the same protections apply at 
sentencing simply because facts proved at sentencing may increase a defendant’s sentence.”). 
3. Readers may be surprised to discover the impressive amount of student scholarship related to
the subjects of this work. See, e.g., Eric P. Berlin, Comment, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ 
Failure to Eliminate Sentencing Disparity: Governmental Manipulations Before Arrest, 1993 Wis. L. 
Rev. 187; Sharon M. Bunzel, Note, The Probation Officer and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: 
Strange Philosophical Bedfellows, 104 Yale L.J. 933 (1995); Amanda Harris, Note, Surpassing 
Sentencing: The Controversial Next Step in Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 1447 
(2012); David A. Hoffman, Note, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Confrontation Rights, 
42 Duke L.J. 382 (1992); Nigel Hugh Holder, Comment, Confrontation at Sentencing: The Logical 
Connection Between Crawford and Blakely, 49 How. L.J. 179 (2005); Christine Holst, Note, The 
Confrontation Clause and Pretrial Hearings: A Due Process Solution, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1599; Note, 
An Argument for Confrontation Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1880 
(1992); Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 821 (1968). 
4. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52 (2004).
5. See Sunrhodes, 831 F.2d at 1543 (citing Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 211 (1972)) (“The
right to confrontation is basically a trial right.”); see also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968). 
6. Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 584 (1959) (affirming Williams, 337 U.S. at 241, and
holding that sentencing judge is not restricted to evidence presented at trial for purposes fixing 
punishment). See generally Eang Ngov, Judicial Nullification of Juries: Use of Acquitted Conduct at 
Sentencing, 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 235, 281–83 (2009). But see Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 607–11 
(1967) (holding that Colorado may not convict under one statute that authorizes a maximum sentence 
of ten years, but sentence for an indeterminate term under another statute).  
7. Edward R. Becker, Insuring Reliable Fact Finding in Guidelines Sentencing: Must the
Guarantees of the Confrontation and Due Process Clauses Be Applied?, 2 Cap. U. L. Rev. 1, 7–8 (1993) 
(describing steps of guidelines sentencing). 
8. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (citation omitted) (noting that ninety-seven
percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions result from a plea of guilty). 
9. See Becker, supra note 7, at 14–16; see also Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Booker, 
38 Ariz. St. L.J. 387, 391 (2006). 
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The Confrontation Clause is not the only fundamental Sixth 
Amendment right to be branded a right that only applies at trial. In the 
past, neither the Counsel nor the Jury Trial Clauses automatically applied 
at felony sentencing.10 Gideon v. Wainwright eventually applied the 
Counsel Clause to all critical stages of the criminal prosecution,11 which 
was ultimately deemed to include sentencing in Mempa v. Rhay.12 
McMillan v. Pennsylvania initially established that the Jury Trial Clause 
only applied to “elements” of the offense, not to “enhancements” to the 
punishment.13 The distinction proved significant considering that elements 
must be established beyond a reasonable doubt at trial and enhancements 
could be established by a preponderance of the evidence at sentencing.14 
Apprendi v. New Jersey radically changed the trial “element” versus 
sentencing “enhancement” distinction and applied the Jury Trial Clause 
to any fact that increased the statutory maximum punishment.15 During 
the 2013 term, the Court quietly but dramatically expanded the scope of 
Apprendi to include mandatory minimum sentences in Alleyne v. United 
States.16 
I advocate for reexamination of the theory that the Confrontation 
Clause is a right that only applies at trial. The Counsel, Confrontation, 
and Jury Trial Clauses are structurally identical and appear to apply in a 
broad sense “[i]n all criminal prosecutions.”17 Each has been deemed 
essential to our system of criminal prosecutions18 but until recently it was 
generally well accepted that the Confrontation Clause only “reflect[ed] a 
preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial.”19 Previously, there was 
10. See Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling the Sixth Amendment, 11 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 487, 520–21 
(2009) (discussing the Court’s interpretation of “criminal prosecution,” the meaning of which depends 
on the procedural right at issue, and advocating for a broad definition based on the term “criminal 
offense”); see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–45 (1963) (holding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause makes the Sixth Amendment right to counsel obligatory on the 
states); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403–08 (1965) (incorporating the Confrontation Clause); 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (incorporating the Jury Trial Clause). These cases were 
decided within six years of each other. 
11. 372 U.S. at 343–45 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932)). 
12. 389 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1967). 
13. 477 U.S. 79, 83–91 (1986). 
14. Id. at 91. 
15. 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000). 
16. 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013). 
17. See U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
18. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–45 (1963) (deeming the right to counsel
fundamental); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965) (noting that the appearance of confrontation 
rights in the Sixth Amendment’s text reflects the Framers’ belief that “confrontation was a 
fundamental right essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 
145, 149 (1968) (“[W]e believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American 
scheme of justice.”). 
19. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (emphasis added), abrogated by Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846–48 (1990) (reasoning 
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a close link between the Confrontation Clause and due process-based 
hearsay rules.20 The understanding of lower courts that examined the 
applicability of the Confrontation Clause at felony sentencing was that 
confrontation and hearsay both originated from due process and were 
designed to protect similar values—trustworthiness and reliability.21 But 
the Court’s re-examination of the historical origin and text of the 
Confrontation Clause in Crawford v. Washington established that “[w]here 
testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability 
sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution 
actually prescribes: confrontation.”22 
This Article proposes uniform application of the Sixth Amendment’s 
Counsel, Jury Trial, and Confrontation Clauses at felony sentencing. I 
argue the Confrontation Clause should apply at what is now the most 
critical post-verdict stage of felony criminal prosecutions where testimonial 
statements are at issue: the sentencing hearing. Part I discusses the Sixth 
Amendment’s text and structure, and the pre-Founding model of 
determinate sentencing. It also explains the origin of the trial-right-only 
rule and discusses the Counsel Clause’s early rejection of the theory. 
Part II discusses the decline of indeterminate sentencing as the dominant 
model for fixing punishment in the United States. It also discusses the 
decades-long erosion of the trial-right-only theory of the Jury Trial 
Clause, as demonstrated in 2013 in Alleyne. Part III explains why 
Counsel and Jury Trial Clause jurisprudence, as well as the Court’s 
recent interpretations of the Confrontation Clause, control the issue of 
whether cross-examination should be allowed at felony sentencing. 
Ultimately, I argue that where testimonial statements are material to 
punishment and where cross-examination will assist the fact finder in 
assessing truth, confrontation should be branded as a right that applies 
through sentencing. 
that the primary purpose of confrontation is to ensure reliability, but that face-to-face confrontation is 
only a preference). 
20. See United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1102–03 (3d Cir. 1990), overruled by United
States v. Grier, 449 F.3d 558 (2006) (arguing that confrontation violations occur only when a court 
relies on misinformation of a constitutional magnitude because hearsay is normally considered at 
sentencing as long as the due process standard is met); see also Chhablani, supra note 10, at 498–99 
(discussing the Burger Court and its reading of confrontation rights to require a showing of 
unreliability as a definitional element). 
21. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (“[It is a] truism that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause
are generally designed to protect similar values, and stem from the same roots.” (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); G. Michael Fenner, Today’s Confrontation Clause (After 
Crawford and Melendez-Diaz), 43 Creighton L. Rev. 35, 37 (2009) (noting that until Crawford, 
confrontation jurisprudence “more or less tracked the hearsay rule”); see also supra note 2. 
22. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69. “Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is
fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation . . . [which] reflects a judgment . . . about how 
reliability can be best determined.” Id. at 61. 
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I.  Origin and Early Rejection of the Counsel Clause as Only a 
Trial Right 
The rule that confrontation does not apply at felony sentencing 
relies on a reading of the Sixth Amendment that is not apparent from the 
text itself.23 The Sixth Amendment provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.24 
The introductory clause, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions,” prefaces all 
of the included procedural rights and protections,25 of which there are as 
many as seven. This Article focuses on three: the Counsel, Jury Trial, and 
Confrontation Clauses.26 
The Sixth Amendment is silent with regard to whether sentencing is 
part of the “criminal prosecution,” a term that the Amendment leaves 
undefined. Moreover, Founding era documents do not provide guidance 
on the meaning or scope of the term.27 This is not surprising, because at 
the time of ratification, felony sentencing was determinate.28 Essentially, 
sentencing proceedings were “virtually indistinguishable from the process 
of conviction.”29 Felony crimes were submitted to a jury and punishment 
23. Benjamin C. McMurray, Challenging Untested Facts at Sentencing: The Applicability of
Crawford at Sentencing After Booker, 37 McGeorge L. Rev. 589, 605–07 (2006) (discussing lower 
court’s “fail[ure] to seriously engage the text of the Sixth Amendment” in ruling that confrontation did 
not apply at felony sentencing). 
24. U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
25. McMurray, supra note 23, at 615. 
26. Chhablani, supra note 10, at 492 (explaining seven procedural protections under the Sixth
Amendment). 
27. See McMurray, supra note 23, at 616, 616 n.191; Stephanos Bibas, Two Cheers, Not Three, for
Sixth Amendment Originalism, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 45, 46 (2011). 
28. John G. Douglass, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing, 
105 Colum. L. Rev. 1967, 2011 (2005) (cautioning against the conclusion that history suggests that “the 
Sixth Amendment contemplates no sentencing rights” simply “because it contemplates no separate 
sentencing proceeding”). 
29. See Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional Rights at
Sentencing, 99 Calif. L. Rev. 47, 51 (2011) (noting that colonial judges did not conduct a formal 
sentencing proceeding following conviction, and that most crimes instead carried a particular penalty 
and the conviction determined the punishment); see also Bibas, supra note 27, at 46 (“Eighteenth-
century trials contained no sentencing phase.”); Douglass, supra note 28, at 1972 (noting that unitary 
guilt and sentencing phases for capital trials were the norm at the time of the Founding); Penny J. 
White, “He Said,” “She Said,” and Issues of Life and Death: The Right to Confrontation at Capital 
Sentencing Proceedings, 19 Regent U. L. Rev. 387, 396 (2007) (“When the Sixth Amendment was 
adopted . . . the sentencing decision was ‘collaps[ed] . . . into the proceeding for determining guilt.’”). 
See generally Susan N. Herman, The Tail that Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding Under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 289, 302–03 (1992). 
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was linked to the crime.30 This model of “unitary prosecution”31 required 
felony “sentencing evidence” to be presented to a jury and confronted by 
defense counsel during the trial.32 The trial was the sentencing in purpose 
and effect.33 
An “original objective meaning” interpretation34 of the Sixth 
Amendment supports the argument that pre-Founding “criminal 
prosecutions” included sentencing.35 An early nineteenth century 
dictionary defined the term “prosecution” as the “institution or 
commencement and continuance of a criminal suit; the process of 
exhibiting formal charges against an offender before a legal tribunal, and 
30. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000); see also 4 William Blackstone,
Commentaries *376 (requiring that after verdict, “the court must pronounce that judgment, which the 
law hath annexed to the crime”); Bibas, supra note 27, at 46, 48 (noting that after a conviction the 
punishment was immediately imposed); Douglass, supra note 28, at 1977 (describing English and early 
American criminal law as dominated by mandatory penalties, not by sentencing discretion); 
McMurray, supra note 23, at 592 (describing sentences in the determinate era as corporal punishment 
or specific fine and noting that from the face of the charging instrument, defendants could predict a 
sentence with precision); White, supra note 29, at 397 (characterizing substantive criminal law as 
sanction-specific or prescribing a specific sentence for an offense). 
31. Douglass, supra note 28, at 2008; White, supra note 29, at 397 (noting that in 1789, two years
before ratification of the Sixth Amendment, “‘criminal prosecution[s]’ began with the return of an 
indictment that contained sufficient facts to notify the defendant of the charge. The jury in the case 
then heard the evidence and determined both the guilt and the punishment of the defendant.”). 
32. The rules appeared to be different for misdemeanors. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 480 n.7
(noting that colonial sentencing judges frequently imposed fines in misdemeanor cases); see also 
Douglass, supra note 28, at 2016 (noting that in the late eighteenth century, English and colonial 
American judges exercised discretion in punishing misdemeanants). 
33. See Douglass, supra note 28, at 1972 (“Bifurcation—separating the guilt determination from
the choice of an appropriate penalty—was a procedure that evolved after the [F]ounding, initially for 
noncapital sentencing.”); see also Hessick & Hessick, supra note 29, at 51 (describing pre-Founding 
sentencing as part of the trial). 
34. “Original objective meaning” or “original public meaning” refers to “the reasonable meaning
of the text of the Constitution at the time of the framing.” Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the 
Records of the State Ratifying Conventions As a Source of the Original Meaning of the U.S. 
Constitution, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. 457, 462. According to Maggs, some Justices, particularly Antonin 
Scalia, consider this meaning to be the most significant. Id. As used in this work, “original objective 
meaning” should be distinguished from “original intent” and “original understanding.” Original intent 
is the meaning the Constitution’s Framers intended, i.e., the meaning and intention of the convention 
that framed and proposed the Constitution for adoption and ratification in the states. Id. at 461. 
Original understanding refers to what those persons who participated in state ratifying conventions 
thought the Constitution meant. Id. 
35. See Douglass, supra note 28, at 2008 (arguing that the answer to the question whether
sentencing is part of the “criminal prosecution” is self-evident because “why bother with the process of 
criminal prosecution if not for the sentence?”); see also White, supra note 29, at 393 (asserting that the 
argument that the right to confront applies at a capital sentencing hearing is supported by a simple 
reading of the relevant constitutional text). At least one jurist agreed with Douglass and White. 
United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 407 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (Arnold, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“Surely no one would contend that sentencing is not a part, and a vital one, of a 
‘criminal prosecution.’”). 
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pursuing them to final judgment.”36 Eminent pre-Founding scholar 
William Blackstone37 described twelve stages of the prosecution, ranging 
from the arrest to execution.38 Blackstone did not specifically list or 
separately label sentencing hearings.39 But his ninth stage, which was 
labeled “Judgment, and its consequences,” corresponds to our modern 
understanding of criminal sentencing.40 In fact, at sentencing modern 
courts do precisely what Blackstone described at the “judgment” stage.41 
Contemporary scholarship agrees with Blackstone’s description of the 
sentencing process as one stage of a criminal prosecution.42 Francis 
Heller, a mid-twentieth century historian, explained that the “criminal 
prosecution” started at arraignment and ended after the sentence was 
announced, unless the defendant was found not guilty.43 
Unfortunately, no post-ratification Sixth Amendment jurisprudence 
provides insight into the question of whether pre-Founding “criminal 
prosecutions” included sentencing. Supreme Court decisions regarding 
the scope of Sixth Amendment rights at felony sentencing hearings do 
not appear until the early twentieth century, when in Johnson v. Zerbst44 
the Court turned its attention to the Counsel Clause. Johnson was 
36. See 2 Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 45 (1828) 
(emphasis added); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004); Random House 
Dictionary of the English Language 1552 (2d ed. 1987). These definitions clarify that the term 
“criminal prosecution” is properly recognized to include all aspects of the criminal proceedings, from 
charging to punishment or acquittal. 
37. The standard way of determining original objective meaning of the words and phrases of the
Constitution is to examine founding period writings. See Maggs, supra note 34, at 462; see also 
McMurray, supra note 23, at 616–17, 616–18 nn.190–99. “Scholars concerned with an original 
understanding of the term ‘prosecution’ are likely to ask how the term was understood by . . . the 
scholarly legal literature of the time—such as William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, which was widely read and relied on by the founders.” Id. at 616. 
38. The twelve stages of the prosecution described by Blackstone include arrest; commitment and 
bail; prosecution; process upon indictment; arraignment and its incidents; plea, and issue; trial and 
conviction; benefit of clergy; judgment, and its consequences; reversal of judgment; reprieve and 
pardon; and execution. See Blackstone, supra note 30, at *v–vi, *289–406. McMurray notes that the 
“prosecution” stage only refers to charging. McMurray, supra note 23, at 617. 
39. See McMurray, supra note 23, at 617–18. 
40. See id. (noting that stage nine “falls chronologically right where sentencing falls under modern
criminal procedure: between trial and appeal”). 
41. See id.; see also Blackstone, supra note 30, at *375–89. 
42. See Douglass, supra note 28, at 2008 (“[Pre-Founding,] a unitary trial and single jury verdict
determined not only guilt or innocence, but life or death as well. With that system as their point of 
reference, they crafted a single set of adversarial rights to govern all of the proceedings that might lead 
to the penalty of death.”); see also McMurray, supra note 23, at 618. 
43. See Francis H. Heller, The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: A
Study in Constitutional Development 54 (1951); see also White, supra note 29, at 395 (“Sixth 
Amendment rights do not begin and end with the in-court proceeding commonly known as a trial.”); 
McMurray, supra note 23, at 616 (arguing that the entire process of securing the criminal judgment is the 
prosecution and noting that the government will typically not dismiss other counts until after sentencing, 
which supports the argument that the prosecution is not yet over until the defendant has been sentenced). 
44. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
June 2014]   UNBRANDING CONFRONTATION 1265 
charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced in federal district court without 
the benefit of counsel.45 The Court ruled Johnson’s conviction and 
sentence could not stand under the Sixth Amendment because he was 
not represented by, and had not competently and intelligently waived, 
counsel.46 By the late 1950s, the Court squarely rejected the trial-right-
only theory of the Counsel Clause in Moore v. Michigan.47 In Moore, the 
Court held that counsel’s representation was not confined only to the 
trial.48 Less than a decade after Moore, the Court held in Gideon v. 
Wainwright that the Counsel Clause applied in state courts.49 Shortly 
thereafter, the Court in Mempa v. Rhay applied the Counsel Clause to an 
array of post-conviction proceedings, including sentencing, appeals, and 
probation hearings.50 
Mempa remains the preeminent post-ratification case discussing the 
application of the Counsel Clause at felony sentencing proceedings in 
state and federal courts.51 Mempa involved unrelated convictions of two 
defendants who pleaded guilty in Washington state court on the advice 
of counsel.52 Both defendants were sentenced to terms of imprisonment 
and released on probation under Washington’s deferred sentencing 
statutes.53 The prosecutor moved to have the probations revoked because 
other crimes were allegedly committed post-release.54 Neither defendant 
was provided counsel at their probation revocation hearings, and both 
45. Id. at 460. 
46. Id. at 468. Much of the Court’s reasoning focused on the importance and role of counsel in felony 
cases. Id. at 462–67. The Court referred to the Counsel Clause as “one of the safeguards . . . deemed 
necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty.” Id. at 462. Moreover, the right to be 
heard would mean little if counsel were unavailable, as defendants are often in need of the “guiding hand 
of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.” Id. at 463. The purpose of counsel is to protect 
defendants from conviction and sentences resulting from their own ignorance of legal and constitutional 
rights. Id. at 465. Ten years later, the Court affirmed Johnson in Townsend v. Burke, but declined to hold 
that counsel was required in all cases. 334 U.S. 736, 739 (1948). Instead, the Court reasoned that the 
conviction and sentence were predicated on misinformation or a misreading of court records that could 
have been prevented had defendant been provided with counsel. Id. at 741. 
47. 355 U.S. 155 (1957). 
48. Id. at 160. Moore, a seventeen-year-old African-American youth, was charged with murdering
an elderly Caucasian woman and was sentenced to solitary confinement and hard labor for life after 
confessing to the murder. Id. at 156. Moore challenged his conviction and sentence based on 
Michigan’s failure to provide counsel during Moore’s plea and sentencing hearings. Id. The Court 
noted that the trial judge’s inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea fulfilled the state’s constitutional 
duty. Id. at 158. The Court held, however, that Moore’s case fell within the class of cases in which the 
intervention of counsel was an essential element of a fair hearing. Id. at 159. The Court emphasized 
that the assistance of counsel was of such critical importance as to be an element of Due Process under 
the Fourteenth Amendment and that Moore had not intelligently waived counsel. Id. at 161. 
49. 372 U.S. 335, 339–45 (1963). 
50. 389 U.S. 128, 136 (1967). 
51. See generally id.
52. Id. at 130–33. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
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were re-incarcerated as a result.55 Both defendants filed habeas petitions 
and claimed violations of the Counsel Clause.56 The Court reversed the 
Washington Supreme Court’s denial of both petitions.57 
Admittedly, Mempa does not answer the question whether the 
Confrontation Clause applies at sentencing. But Mempa ultimately 
rejected a strict trial-right-only theory of the Counsel Clause and 
acknowledged that post-trial proceedings could be of a critical nature in 
a criminal case.58 In doing so, the Mempa Court was not persuaded by 
arguments that the revocation hearing was a mere formality or that any 
violation of the Counsel Clause was remedied because defendants were 
provided with the assistance of counsel at trial.59 At the revocation 
hearing, counsel was necessary for marshaling and proving the facts, 
introducing evidence, and generally aiding and assisting the defendants.60 
Fundamentally, the Court affirmed Gideon’s mandate of counsel at every 
stage of the “criminal prosecution” that implicated procedural and 
substantial rights. 
II. Origin and Erosion of the Jury Trial Clause as Only a Trial
Right 
The rule that the Jury Trial Clause applied solely at the trial stage of 
a criminal prosecution developed simultaneously as indeterminate 
sentencing lost favor as the dominant model of fixing punishment in the 
United States. During the indeterminate era, broad judicial discretion 
existed to ensure that punishment fit the offender as well as the offense.61 
At the height of the indeterminate era, judicial discretion was curbed 




58. Id. Additionally, the Court recognized that a number of lower courts had already ruled that
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to sentencing in federal cases. Id. at 134 n.4 (citing 
Nunley v. United States, 283 F.2d 651 (10th Cir. 1960); McKinney v. United States, 208 F.2d 844 (D.C. 
Cir. 1953); Martin v. United States, 182 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1950)). 
59. Mempa, 389 U.S. at 135. 
60. Id. 
61. See Douglas A. Berman, Foreword: Beyond Blakely and Booker: Pondering Modern
Sentencing Process, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 653, 654 (2005). Berman argues that the 
“rehabilitative medical model” was conceived and discussed in medical terms, with offenders 
described as sick and punishments aspiring to cure. Id. (citing J.L. Miller et al., Sentencing Reform: 
A Review and Annotated Bibliography 1–6 (1981)). For Berman, sentencing became both 
administrative, in that sentencing judges and parole officials were expected to craft individualized 
sentences, and clinical, “almost like a doctor or social worker.” See Berman, supra, at 655 (citing 
United States v. Mueffelman, 327 F. Supp. 2d 79, 83 (D. Mass. 2004)); see also Douglass, supra note 28, 
at 2018 n.295 (describing individualized punishment as “reflecting a ‘scientific’ view that crime was a 
form of sickness that might be cured with proper treatment of an individual”); Sandra Shane-DuBow 
et al., Sentencing Reform in the United States: History, Content, and Effect 5–6 (1985); 
McMurray, supra note 23, at 592; Hessick & Hessick, supra note 29, at 52. 
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cruel and unusual punishment.62 Sentencing judges were not required to 
seek the jury’s guidance63 and frequently engaged in post-trial fact finding 
to punish within the statutory range.64 This contrasted sharply with pre-
Founding determinate era felony sentencing, when judges rarely engaged 
in post-verdict fact finding to fix punishment.65 
As indeterminate sentencing developed, improved means of 
transportation and communication brought people closer together, 
multiplied frictions, and required increased governmental supervision.66 
This burdened law enforcement officials,67 courts,68 and the public.69 
62. McMurray, supra note 23, at 592. 
63. Id. (citing Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 
39 Val. U. L. Rev. 693, 697 (2005)); Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing As Democratic Practice, 89 Va. 
L. Rev. 311, 316–19, 354 (2003) (noting that by 1796, one state sentenced by jury, and by 1919, 
fourteen states sentenced by jury, but that by 2003, only six states sentenced by jury). But see 
Douglass, supra note 28, at 2013–14 (describing the widespread practice of jury sentencing in capital 
cases during the American constitutional period). 
64. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 29, at 52. Hessick and Hessick noted that discretionary
schemes were originally premised on the punishment rational of rehabilitation and that judges’ 
assessments were based on specific sentencing characteristics with an eye toward reforming the 
criminal defendant’s law breaking ways. Id. Sentencing characteristics included the defendant’s age, 
prior criminal history, employment history, family ties, educational level, military service, and 
charitable activities. Id. 
65.  McMurray, supra note 23, at 592 (noting that confrontation at sentencing was irrelevant
under the determinate model because there was no fact finding at the time the sentence was 
announced and thus, no witnesses to confront). Blackstone reported that only in exceptional cases did 
determinate era sentencing judges exercise discretion to impose fines or determine the length of 
imprisonment. Blackstone, supra note 30, at *378. Generally, the “nature of the punishment . . . 
[either] by fine or imprisonment, [was] . . . fixed and determinate: though the duration and quantity of 
each must vary, from the aggravations or otherwise of the offence, the quality and condition of the 
parties, and from innumerable other circumstances.” See id.; see also Alan C. Michaels, Trial Rights at 
Sentencing, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 1771, 1814 n.180, 1814–25 (2003). 
66. See Justin Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 18 (1927); see also
J.C. McWhorter, Abolish the Jury, 57 Am. L. Rev. 42, 43 (1923) (opining that automobiles afforded 
criminals the ability to “play hide and seek” with law enforcement). 
67. Miller, supra note 66, at 19. Miller argued that inadequacies with regard to law enforcement
staff, equipment, and cohesive administrative guidance and direction made it impossible for law 
enforcement “to cope successfully with the professional banditry of th[e] scientific age.” See id.; see 
also Sam B. Warner & Henry B. Cabot, Changes in the Administration of Criminal Justice During the 
Past Fifty Years, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 583, 590, 595 (1937) (noting the large increases in petty offenses and 
the recent revival of outlawry, which the author attributed to the inability of the courts and authorities 
to handle modern crime); McWhorter, supra note 66, at 42 (“[T]he public mind is becoming so 
accustomed to lawlessness that it is acquiring that listless indifference which long and unconcerned 
familiarity begets. Unpunished crime has become a matter-of-course thing in the public mind.”). 
68. See Miller, supra note 66, at 20 (noting the inadequacy of courts to accommodate their
increased burden and the irksome burden of jury duty on the public); see also Jennifer L. Mnookin, 
Uncertain Bargains: The Rise of Plea Bargaining in America, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1721, 1728 (2005) 
(reviewing George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph: A History of Plea Bargaining in America 
(2003)) (arguing that increased caseloads significantly contributed to the judiciary’s changing attitude 
about the merits of negotiated pleas); Warner & Cabot, supra note 67, at 590 (noting that the number 
of judges did not keep pace with the striking population growth). 
69. See Raymond Moley, The Vanishing Jury, 2 S. Cal. L. Rev. 97, 106 (1928) (noting the small
minority of convictions that actually involved a jury); McWhorter, supra note 66, at 47, 51 (arguing 
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Inadequacies and lack of cohesive administrative guidance made it 
impossible to combat the “professional banditry of th[e] scientific age.”70 
Large increases in “outlawry” further evidenced the inability of authorities 
to handle “modern” crime.71 J.C. McWhorter, an early twentieth century 
legal commentator, lamented in 1923 that the public had become listlessly 
indifferent to lawlessness because crime so often went unpunished.72 As 
incarceration became an increasingly available form of punishment, the 
public was increasingly persuaded by policy arguments in favor of 
individualized rather than determinate sentences.73 
The role of counsel in criminal cases also expanded during the 
indeterminate era,74 perhaps as a direct effect of the Constitution’s 
adoption of an adversarial system of trial, or perhaps due to the increase 
in criminality.75 Throughout the U.S. colonies, knowledgeable and 
experienced defense bars emerged.76 By the mid-eighteenth century, the 
acquittal rate for represented defendants in New Jersey was seventy-
seven percent, while the acquittal rate for unrepresented defendants was 
merely eighteen percent.77 In 1834, almost a century later, virtually every 
defendant in New York requested or received the assistance of counsel.78 
That counsel was available to defendants did not mean that the 
adversarial system that we know today existed during the emergence of 
indeterminate sentencing.79 The point here is that by the height of the 
indeterminate era, the United States had developed a distinct adversarial 
system. Yet few constitutionally prescribed controls limited judicial 
discretion at felony sentencing, in part due to a lack of uniform sentencing 
procedures and in part due to a reduced number of felony trials. 
Counsel’s expanded role emerged simultaneously with two other 
notable developments of post-Founding indeterminate sentencing: plea-
bargaining80 and bifurcation of trial and sentencing.81 Bifurcation created 
that the jury has “lived out the days of . . . usefulness,” stating that it was “difficult to imagine a more 
illogical and unbusiness-like way of trying cases than by a jury of twelve men selected as they are”). 
70. Miller, supra note 66, at 19. 
71. Warner & Cabot, supra note 67, at 590, 595. 
72. McWhorter, supra note 66, at 43. 
73. Douglass, supra note 28, at 2018. 
74. See Miller, supra note 66, at 16–18 (noting the creation of new laws prohibiting the
manufacture and sale of liquor, regulating securities, and governing the issuances of checks and other 
evidences of value, as well as new laws regulating automobiles); see also Warner & Cabot, supra note 
67, at 585 (noting the increase in criminality and prosecutions). 
75. Randolph N. Jonakait, The Rise of the American Adversary System: America Before England, 
14 Widener L. Rev. 323, 327–28 (2009). 
76. Id. at 331. 
77. Id. at 330–31 (noting that by the middle of the eighteenth century, a defendant in colonial
New Jersey was roughly four times more likely to be acquitted if represented by counsel). 
78. Id. at 331–32. 
79. Id. at 334. 
80. See Mary E. Vogel, The Social Origins of Plea Bargaining: Conflict and the Law in the Process 
of State Formation, 1830–1860, 33 Law & Soc’y Rev. 161, 161, 173 (1999) (noting the emergence of 
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separate “sentencing hearings,” resulting in a distinct and separate 
procedural phase of the criminal prosecution82 during which judges 
exercised broad discretion to determine the length of imprisonment.83 By 
necessity, this appeared to require consideration of information about 
the defendant that was not presented during the trial.84 Once guilt was 
entered, sentencing judges exercised virtually unlimited discretion to 
determine the range of imprisonment.85 
It is difficult to pinpoint when bifurcation or guilty pleas became the 
norm. Like bifurcation, evidence of guilty pleas prior to the Founding in 
the English common law system and the U.S. colonies is rare.86 But by 
the late 1830s, guilty pleas arose in the colonies, and ten years later, they 
were accepted for practically every sort of offense.87 By mid-century, plea 
bargaining was well institutionalized88 and judges were willingly involved 
in the process.89 But early plea bargaining may not have been initiated by 
plea bargaining during the 1830s and 1840s). The adoption of adult parole and probation services was 
also an important development during the post-Founding era. See Warner & Cabot, supra note 67, at 
599 (discussing the creation of reformatories for young male offenders and arguing that adoption of 
the indeterminate sentencing and parole law occurred together). Warner and Cabot also noted that 
the first instances of probation occurred in seventeenth century Massachusetts and that by 1910, 
twenty states had adopted adult probation statutes. See id. at 598–99. Warner and Cabot indicated that 
the duty of the probation officer was to furnish the judge with information about a defendant’s 
criminal history. Id. at 607. While the sentencing judge decided the punishment, it was the parole 
board that decided the date of release. See id. See generally Ricardo J. Bascuas, The American 
Inquisition: Sentencing After the Federal Guidelines, 45 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1, 11 (2010) (discussing 
early statutory history of probation in federal system). 
81. See Iontcheva, supra note 63, at 314–30 (2003) (discussing origins of jury sentencing in the
United States and causes of its decline); Michaels, supra note 65, at 1814 n.180. 
82. See Herman, supra note 29, at 302. 
83. Douglass, supra note 28, at 2019. Douglass suggests that bifurcation was the result of the need 
to separately consider information at a sentencing hearing that could not be introduced at trial. Id. at 
2018–19 (arguing that the rules of evidence conflicted with the emerging preference for making 
punishment fit not only the crime, but also the individual criminal because evidence relating to bad 
character was considered unfairly prejudicial and inadmissible at trial). 
84. Id. at 2018 (noting the new goal of individualized sentences and arguing that if indeterminate
era “judges were to tailor their sentences to fit individual offenders, they needed to know more about 
that individual than a trial—or guilty plea—was likely to tell them”). 
85. Warner & Cabot, supra note 67, at 606–07. 
86. See Vogel, supra note 80, at 161, 173. 
87. See id. at 175 (demonstrating surge in guilty pleas in Boston from less than 15% in 1830, to
28.6% in 1840, 52% in 1850, 55.6% in 1860, and 88% in 1880). Vogel argued that plea bargaining rose 
as part of a “process of political stabilization,” as part of an “effort to legitimate institutions of self-
rule,” and as part of an imposition of “social control in a way that avoided any delegitimizing use of 
force.” Id. at 161, 227. 
88. See id. at 174–75 (discussing plea bargaining in nineteenth century Boston). 
89. Miller, supra note 66, at 2. Miller argued that the concept of forgiveness by an aggrieved
person, which he described as “condonation,” was long recognized by 1927, but had no effect in 
preventing prosecution. Id. “In practice, however, the condonation and compromise of criminal cases 
[was] frequent and the methods of evading the clear purpose of the written law [were] varied.” See id.; 
see also Moley, supra note 69, at 107, 118 (noting generational increase in the proportion of guilty 
pleas). Moley notes that by 1926 in Cook County, Illinois, 13,117 felony prosecutions entered 
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the same parties as it is today. Some indeterminate era judges openly 
bargained with the defendant in court90 while others refused to participate 
in negotiations between the parties.91 Judges who participated in pleas 
could have also privately expressed to the parties the propriety of a 
settlement.92 
Critics of indeterminate sentencing initially questioned the lack of 
procedural and substantive rules governing the bifurcated sentencing 
hearings93—and to a lesser extent, guilty pleas.94 The Honorable Marvin 
E. Frankel, widely considered the father of modern sentencing reform,95 
lamented wide disparities in punishment, which substantively turned 
“arbitrarily upon the variegated passions and prejudices of individual 
judges.”96 Judge Frankel also noted the absence of procedural rules97 and 
the limited role of appellate courts, which had authority to review 
preliminary hearing and 492 resulted in a complete jury trial; during the same year in Chicago, slightly 
more than one percent of cases initiated as felonies resulted in a jury verdict of guilty on the felony 
charge. Id. There also appeared to be an increase in jury trial waivers, presumably in favor of bench 
trials. See Warner & Cabot, supra note 67, at 592 (noting that in the late nineteenth century waiver of 
jury trial in criminal cases was common in few states, but that by 1937 it was “permitted by 
constitution, statute or judicial decision in the federal courts and those of over half the states”). These 
sources do not specify whether the remaining cases were resolved by dismissals, guilty pleas, or bench 
trials. 
90. See id.; see also Moley, supra note 69, at 103 (describing the early use of guilty pleas as a
defense strategy that also had advantages for prosecutors, who would not be “compelled to carry 
through an onerous and protracted trial,” and judges, who “escape[] the danger of being reversed on 
some point of law”). 
91. Miller, supra note 66, at 8, 10. Cases in which pleas were commonly used included violation of
liquor laws; automobile thefts; desertion or failure to provide for wife or children; sex cases, including 
seduction and statutory rape; and larceny or accusations for issuing fraudulent checks or obtaining 
money or property by fraudulent means. Id. at 12–16. 
92. Id. at 10. 
93. See Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 5, 7–8, (1972); see also
United States v. Clark, 792 F. Supp. 637, 650 (E.D. Ark. 1992) (citing Sentencing Comm’n, 
Supplementary Report on the Initial Sentencing Guidelines 3 n.15 (1987)); Stephen A. Saltzburg, 
Due Process, History, and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 38 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 243, 243 (2001) (noting that 
the absence of standards that governed criminal sentencing in the indeterminate era adduced an 
arbitrariness that was compounded by the absence of rules of evidence and standards of proof). 
94. See Klein, supra note 63, at 699 (noting decline of indeterminate model in the early 1970s); see 
also Douglas A. Berman, Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender Characteristics in Modern 
Sentencing Reforms, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 277, 279 (2005); Berman, supra note 9, at 393. 
95. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Marvin Frankel, Federal Judge and Pioneer of Sentencing
Guidelines, Dies at 81, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 2002, at C15 (describing Frankel as a “legal scholar whose 
views helped to establish sentencing guidelines for federal courts”). This Article refers to the federal 
sentencing guidelines as “the Guidelines.” 
96. Frankel, supra note 93, at 5, 7–8; Berman, supra note 61, at 655 (noting that some outcomes
and disparities could be attributed to race, gender, and socioeconomic status). 
97. Marvin E. Frankel, Sentencing Guidelines: A Need for Creative Collaboration, 101 Yale L.J. 
2043, 2044 (1992) (noting common use of information at sentencing that had not been cross-examined 
or otherwise exposed to adversarial or independent scrutiny). 
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sentences only on rare or extraordinary grounds.98 He pondered whether 
rehabilitative goals were necessary and realistic99 and noted that judges 
and probation officers rarely communicated about a defendant or his 
“treatment.”100 Finally, Judge Frankel described the trial court’s physical 
observations of the defendant as a minor and fleeting factor at best, and 
at worst—overdrawn and overweighed judicial folklore.101 
Critique of the lack of procedural and substantive criminal 
sentencing rules was partially addressed in In re Winship,102 Mullaney v. 
Wilbur,103 and Patterson v. New York.104 Winship dubbed the reasonable 
doubt standard a protectant of the presumption of innocence105 and 
established that every fact necessary to constitute the charged offense106 
must be proven by that standard.107 Winship remained silent on how to 
98. Frankel, supra note 93, at 5, 7, 23–24. Frankel points out that unless there was an egregious
departure from the law, indeterminate era sentences were unreviewable “if within the commonly 
extravagant bounds of the statute.” See id. at 23; see also Saltzburg, supra note 93, at 244 (noting that 
sentences in the indeterminate era, whether imposed by judges or by juries, were “largely uncontrolled 
by appellate review”). 
99. See Frankel, supra note 93, at 29–31; see also Berman, supra note 94, at 279. 
 100. Frankel, supra note 93, at 10–12; id. at 37–38 (describing “poor performance record” of 
probation office). Frankel also questioned the common practice of separating questions of guilt from 
punishment. Id. at 5. 
101. Id. at 27. 
102. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
103. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). 
104. 432 U.S. 197, 205–07 (1977). 
105. Winship, 397 U.S. at 363. 
106. Id. at 358–59. Section 712 of the New York Family Court Act defined a juvenile delinquent as 
“a person over seven and less than sixteen years of age who does any act which, if done by an adult, 
would constitute a crime.” Id. at 359. Winship, who was less than sixteen years of age, allegedly 
entered a locker and stole $112 from a woman’s pocket book. Id. at 359–60. Section 744(b) of the New 
York Family Code required that “[a]ny determination at the conclusion of [an adjudicatory] hearing 
that a [juvenile] did act or acts must be based on a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 360. 
Winship’s eighteen-month sentence was subject to annual extensions until his eighteenth birthday, for 
a total of six years. Id. at 359–60. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed 
without opinion. See id. at 360; see also In re Samuel W., 247 N.E.2d 253, 254 (N.Y. 1969). According 
to the New York Court of Appeals, a lawyer’s duty in a criminal case was to see her client acquitted, 
the charges reduced, or the punishment minimized. Id. at 255. In a juvenile proceeding, the lawyer’s 
duty is to do what is in the best interest of the child. Id. at 255–56. Findings of guilt in juvenile 
adjudications were not convictions that affected rights or privileges and thus enjoyed the protective 
cover of confidentiality. Id. Because delinquency status was not a crime and juvenile proceedings were 
not criminal, there was no deprivation of due process. Id. at 257–58. According to the New York 
courts, equal protection arguments failed because juvenile proceedings were distinguishable from 
criminal prosecutions. Id. 
 107. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364. According to the Court, the requirement of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt dated at least to the Founding and was long assumed to be constitutionally required 
in criminal cases. Id. at 360, 362. But see id. at 377 (Black, J., dissenting) (doubting whether guilt by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt was expressly or impliedly commanded in the Constitution). At the 
Founding, guilt by proof beyond a reasonable doubt was required in both delinquency proceeding 
against juveniles and criminal proceedings against adults. Id. at 367–68. But see id. at 386 (Black, J., 
dissenting) (“[W]hen, as here, a State through its duly constituted legislative branch decides to apply a 
1272 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:1257 
determine which facts were necessary to prove the charge.108 A narrow 
approach was chosen in Mullaney, which only required proof beyond 
reasonable doubt of the “elements of the offense.”109 Two years later, 
Patterson excluded affirmative defenses from the category of facts that 
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.110 
Less than a decade after Winship, Mullaney, and Patterson, the 
federal government and the states heeded calls for limited judicial 
discretion at criminal sentencing and for structured criminal procedural 
rules that provided tougher appellate review of sentences.111 The 
Sentencing Reform Act (“SRA”) was passed in 1984 and would provide 
the blueprint for felony sentencing rules in federal courts.112 The SRA 
created the United States Sentencing Commission (“Commission”), 
which was tasked with drafting the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
(“Guidelines”).113 The Guidelines rejected rehabilitation as the central 
principle for structured sentencing and expressly called for sentences to 
provide “just punishment.”114 The Guidelines also calculated punishment 
different standard, then that standard, unless it is otherwise unconstitutional, must be applied to insure 
that persons are treated according to the ‘law of the land.’”). 
 108. See id. at 364; see also Ronald J. Allen et al., From Winship to Apprendi to Booker: 
Constitutional Command or Constitutional Blunder?, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 195, 202 (2005). See generally 
Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 
110 Yale L.J. 1097, 1103 (2001); Leslie Yalof Garfield, Back to the Future: Does Apprendi Bar a 
Legislature’s Power to Shift the Burden of Proof away from the Prosecution by Labeling an Element of 
a Traditional Crime As an Affirmative Defense?, 35 Conn. L. Rev. 1351, 1357 (2003). 
 109. In Mullaney, the Court interpreted a Maine law that defined murder as an unlawful killing 
with malice aforethought, which was presumed; a killing without malice aforethought was 
manslaughter. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 686 n.3 (1975) (quoting Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, 
§ 2651 (1964)). Maine argued that defendants had the burden to prove heat of passion, which would
qualify the killing as manslaughter. Id. at 699. The Court reasoned that Winship was not limited to 
“elements” as defined by state law and held that the prosecution has the burden to prove heat of 
passion beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 
 110. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 205–08 (1977) (distinguishing between affirmative 
defenses and statutory elements and reasoning that affirmative defenses do not allow the state to 
presume or infer any facts against defendants); see also Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The 
Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 446, 462–63 (1985) 
(characterizing tension between Mullaney and Patterson as “a dispute over how to delineate the limits 
of a state’s power to define the ‘essential facts’ of a crime”). Additionally, there was no constitutional 
presumption of innocence at sentencing. Michaels, supra note 65, at 1778. See generally Mark D. Knoll 
& Richard G. Singer, Searching for the “Tail of the Dog”: Finding “Elements” of Crimes in the Wake of 
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 22 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1057, 1081 (1999) (“Patterson opened the door for 
creative legislatures to evade the fundamental protections afforded in Winship by carefully drafting 
their statutes.”). 
111. Berman, supra note 9, at 394; Frankel, supra note 93, at 54. 
 112. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended 
at scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
113. See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon 
Which They Rest, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 4–5 (1988); see also Saltzburg, supra note 93, at 243 n.2. 
 114. Berman, supra note 94, at 280; see Kyron Huigens, Panel Two: Considerations at Sentencing—
What Factors Are Relevant and Who Should Decide? Solving the Williams Puzzle, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 
1048, 1052 (2005) (discussing policy arguments for discretionary and guidelines sentencing). 
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by assigning points to specific facts115 about the offender and offense.116 The 
Guidelines were mandatory: sentencing courts were required to explain 
the basis for departures from the applicable range of punishment117 and 
appellate courts were granted increased authority to review sentences.118 
Two years after the SRA was enacted, the Supreme Court tested 
Pennsylvania’s Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act (“MMSA”)119 in 
McMillan v. Pennsylvania. The MMSA imposed a minimum sentence of 
five years for offenses committed while in “visible possession” of a 
firearm.120 The MMSA did not require visible possession to be proven to 
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt before application of the five-year 
minimum sentence.121 Instead, the MMSA permitted Pennsylvania 
sentencing judges to consider evidence already introduced at trial as well 
as evidence produced for the first time at the sentencing hearing, all of 
which would be judged by the court by a preponderance of the 
evidence.122 If the prosecution established that the underlying offense 
involved visible possession of a firearm, the MMSA divested sentencing 
judges of discretion to impose a sentence of less than five years.123 
Presumably, sentences in excess of the statutory maximum were also not 
authorized.124 Four Pennsylvania sentencing judges refused to apply the 
MMSA because it did not allow the jury to evaluate visible possession.125 
The Court coined the term “sentencing enhancement,”126 which was 
distinguishable from an “offense element,” and held that state legislatures 
had authority to designate certain facts as “enhancements.”127 
 115. Breyer, supra note 113, at 7–8. Categories and sentence length were determined by an 
analysis of 10,000 actual cases. See id. at 7; see also Becker, supra note 7, at 7–8. 
 116. See Breyer, supra note 113, at 5; see also Bascuas, supra note 80, at 8–9 (discussing 
methodology of the Guidelines); Becker, supra note 7, at 7–8 (same). 
 117. See Breyer, supra note 113, at 5; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal 
Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 33, 93 (2003). 
 118. Breyer, supra note 113, at 5–6; see Bascuas, supra note 80, at 28 (discussing standard of review 
under the Guidelines). 
119. Breyer, supra note 113, at 3; Berman, supra note 9, at 394. 





125. Id. at 82–84. 
126. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 500 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“McMillan . . . 
spawned a special sort of fact known as a sentencing enhancement.”); Knoll & Singer, supra note 110, 
at 1058 (describing McMillan as marking the “birth of the ‘sentencing factor’”); Jeffrey L. Fisher, 
Originalism as an Anchor for the Sixth Amendment, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 53, 62 (2011) (defining 
a sentencing factor as a particular fact that the legislature determined should subject the defendant to 
an increased sentence). 
 127. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85–86. According to the Court, the MMSA did not disregard the 
presumption of innocence; in fact, it created no presumptions. Id. at 86–87. Nor did the MMSA relieve 
the prosecution of its burden. Id. at 87. The MMSA did not alter the maximum penalty for the crime 
committed or create a separate offense calling for a separate penalty. Id. at 87–88. Finally, the MMSA 
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McMillan established the element/enhancement distinction as the 
constitutional limit to legislative authority128 but allowed state legislatures 
to designate which facts were elements or enhancements.129 By the 
millennium, Jones v. United States130 limited McMillan to require Congress 
and state legislatures to include traditional elements in the definition of 
crimes.131 The next year, in Castillo v. United States,132 the Court appeared 
to provide a framework to distinguish between traditional elements and 
sentencing enhancements.133 Castillo was indicted for conspiring to murder 
federal officers in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), which prohibited the 
use or carrying of a “firearm” in relation to a crime of violence.134 Penalties 
increased dramatically when the firearm was a machine gun.135 The Court 
held that the “machine gun” finding constituted an element of a separate 
offense.136 
Castillo found type of firearm an offense element despite the fact 
that Congress designated it a sentencing enhancement.137 In so holding, 
the Castillo Court did little to calm the escalating tension between the 
Jury Trial Clause and McMillan’s broad grant of legislative authority to 
choose between elements and enhancements. The Court’s internal 
did not change the definition of any existing offense. See id. at 88–90; see also Bibas, supra note 108, at 
1106 (detailing factors for the Apprendi Court’s finding that the sentencing enhancements were 
constitutional). 
128. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85–88. 
 129. See id. at 85 (“[I]t is normally ‘within the power of the state to regulate procedures under 
which its laws are carried out, including the burden of producing evidence and the burden of 
persuasion.’”) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201–02 (1977)); see also Berman, supra 
note 9, at 399. 
130. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999). Jones was convicted of violating the federal 
carjacking statute which carries a maximum fifteen-year sentence, unless serious bodily injury or death 
occurs. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2119(1)–(3) (1999). A twenty-five year imprisonment was imposed based on the 
finding at sentencing that serious bodily injury resulted. Jones, 526 U.S. at 230–31. 
 131. Id. at 231–44. The Court held that section 2119 defined three separate offenses that each must 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 231–39. The Court warned that its holding rested on rules 
of statutory interpretation rather than the Constitution. See id. at 252 n.11; see also Andrew M. Levine, 
The Confounding Boundaries of ‘Apprendi-Land’: Statutory Minimums and the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 29 Am. J. Crim. L. 377, 398 (2002). 
132. Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120 (2000). 
133. Id. at 124–31. 
134. Id. at 122. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 121. 
137. Id. at 124. The Castillo Court made five specific findings to support its holding that firearm type 
was an offense element. First, the statute listed the basic offense elements in the first sentence and the 
sentencing enhancements in the remaining subsequent sentences. Id. at 124–25. Second, the type of 
firearm had not typically or traditionally been a sentencing factor because it neither involved 
characteristics of the offender nor special features the offense. Id. at 126–27. Third, to ask a jury, rather 
than the judge, to determine the type of firearm would rarely complicate trial or result in unfairness. Id. at 
127–28. Fourth, the legislative history did not support interpreting section 924(c) as setting forth 
sentencing factors. Id. at 129–30. Finally, the twenty-five year increase attached to the machine gun 
finding was extreme, which weighed in favor of treating firearm type as an element. Id. at 131. 
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debate focused on procedural and substantive characteristics of felony 
sentencing at the time of the Founding.138 A slight majority had come to 
understand that pre-Founding a pre-determined sentence resulted139 once 
the jury found guilt.140 This majority believed that the Sixth Amendment’s 
text and structure reflected pre-Founding determinate jury sentencing in 
felony cases.141 
On the day Castillo ruled that type of firearm was an element under 
section 924(c), Apprendi v. New Jersey overturned a sentence that was 
also based, in part, on post-verdict judicial fact finding.142 Apprendi was 
convicted under a New Jersey statute that classified unlawful possession of 
a firearm a second-degree offense.143 Punishment for unlawful possession 
of a firearm ranged from five to ten years.144 Under a separate statute, 
New Jersey extended the term of imprisonment for unlawful possession 
while committing a racially motivated crime.145 The racial motive—or 
“hate crime” enhancement—did not require a jury, could be proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence, and increased punishment to a range of 
 138. See generally Donald A. Dripps, The Constitutional Status of Reasonable Doubt Rule, 
75 Calif. L. Rev. 1665, 1701 (1987); Herman, supra note 29, at 323–25, 328, 344; Knoll & Singer, supra 
note 110, at 1061–62, 1067–68, 1078–79 (discussing historical difference between an “offense” and its 
“elements,” as well as “elements” and “facts looked to by a judge to determine the sentence”). 
 139. See Douglass, supra note 28, at 2011 (citing Whitnan J. Hou, Capital Retrials and 
Resentencing: Whether to Appeal and Resentencing Fairness, 16 Cap. Def. J. 19, 30 (2003)); see also 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289 (1976) (citing Hugo A. Bedau, The Death Penalty in 
America 5–6, 15, 27–28 (rev. ed. 1967)) (“At the time the [Bill of Rights] was adopted in 1791, the 
States uniformly followed the common-law practice of making death the exclusive and mandatory 
sentence for certain specified offenses.”). Death could be accomplished by hanging, embowelment, 
and burying alive. Blackstone, supra note 30, at *376–77. By no means was death the exclusive 
punishment for felonies, merely the most common. See id. at *377. Other punishment included 
deprivation of sensation by strangling, mutilation or dismembering, slitting of the nostrils, branding of 
the hand, whipping, hard labor, exile, banishment, loss of liberty, and temporary imprisonment. Id. 
Despite these myriad of options, Blackstone makes clear that the quantity or degree of punishment 
was “ascertained for every offence[,] and that it [wa]s not left in the breast of any judge, nor even of a 
jury, to alter that judgment.” Id. Blackstone warned that “if judgments were to be the private opinions 
of the judge, men would then be slaves to their magistrates[,] and would live in society without 
knowing exactly the conditions and obligations which it lays them under.” Id. 
 140. White, supra note 29, at 396 (describing the modern day trial as involving a bifurcated process 
by which there is a finding of guilt or innocence by a jury and a subsequent determination of 
punishment by a judge); Douglass, supra note 28, at 1968 (describing the trial world as a highly 
structured and elaborate body of precedent that defines substantive rights, but describing the 
sentencing world as an informal, free-flowing kind of place that has with few hard rules). According to 
Douglass, “few ‘trial rights’ survive intact after a guilty verdict.” Id. 
 141. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 29, at 51 (noting that determinate sentencing schemes 
“presented no occasion to consider the extent to which constitutional protections should be treated 
differently at sentencing than at trial”). But see Fenner, supra note 21, at 37; Nancy J. King & Susan R. 
Klein, Essential Elements, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1467, 1507–08 (2001). 
 142. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468–90 (2000); see also Michaels, supra note 65, at 
1814 n.180. 
143. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 468–69. 
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ten to twenty years.146 Apprendi pleaded guilty to unlawful possession 
and was never charged with any type of hate crime.147 The judge imposed 
a twelve-year sentence based on the court’s own finding at sentencing 
that Apprendi’s acts were racially motivated.148 The New Jersey Supreme 
Court, relying on McMillan, affirmed and held that motivation was a 
traditional sentencing factor.149 
The Apprendi Court examined the adequacy of New Jersey’s 
sentencing procedure and qualified McMillan’s longstanding deference 
to legislative choice between elements and enhancements. The Court 
reasoned that the right to a jury determination of guilt of every element 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt was a historical foundation of 
the common law.150 The Court reflected on criminal prosecutions at time 
of the Founding and the lack of judicial discretion because of sanction-
specific criminal laws.151 During the Founding, guilt and punishment were 
invariably linked and there was no distinction between an element and 
an enhancement.152 In the Court’s view, even though the practice of 
unitary trial and sentencing may have changed, modern courts must still 
“adhere to the basic principle[s].”153 Because the jury trial right was one 
of surpassing importance in the common law,154 there was no “principled 
basis for treating [enhancements and elements] differently.”155 Guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt was designated a historically significant 
companion right to a jury verdict.156 Both reflected “a profound judgment 
about the way in which law should be enforced and justice 
administered.”157 
Apprendi also limited McMillan to the extent that designating certain 
facts as elements158 rather than enhancements could thwart Winship.159 To 
combat attempts to circumvent Winship, Apprendi embraced a principle 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 469. 
148. Id.  
149. Id. at 471–74. 
150. Id. at 477 (citing Blackstone, supra note 30, at *343). 
151. Id. at 479 (citations omitted). 
152. Id. at 485. 
153. Id. at 483–84 (emphasis added). But see id. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing 
Apprendi not as a sharp break from the past, but a reflection of the Sixth Amendment’s original 
meaning). 
154. Id. at 476. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 478. 
157. Id. 
158. See id. at 485; see also Knoll & Singer, supra note 110, at 1114, 1118 (declaring “Winship lives 
again”). 
 159. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484–86, 487 n.13 (“[I]t [was] unconstitutional for a legislature to 
remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties.”); see also 
Fisher, supra note 126, at 56 (concluding that the firearm enhancement was a classic example of an 
aggravated crime, and describing Apprendi as a very easy case). 
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that was foreshadowed a year earlier160: “any fact [other than a prior 
conviction] that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”161 By its terms, Apprendi applied only when post-
verdict judicial fact finding involved imposition of a sentence more 
severe than the statutory maximum.162 The Court ruled that the hate 
crime enhancement required a jury determination of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt without reference to Castillo.163 
A broad reading of Apprendi seemed to require a jury determination 
of all facts that would increase punishment, which would fundamentally 
implicate structured sentencing schemes like the Guidelines. At least one 
member of the Apprendi majority rejected this view; one dissenter foresaw 
the threat.164 Arguments that McMillian authorized legislatures—not 
sentencing commissions—to choose between elements and enhancements 
strengthened after Apprendi.165 The Guidelines and other structured 
sentencing schemes were alleged to have eliminated judicial discretion too 
much,166 which in turn lead to increased prosecutorial authority167 and 
160. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999). 
 161. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; see also Knoll & Singer, supra note 110, at 1114 (“The big news 
in Jones, however, is that the Court all but adopted a Constitutional rule, based on the Sixth 
Amendment jury trial right, precluding the designation as a sentencing factor any item that would 
significantly increase the sentence.”). 
162. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487 n.13; see also Levine, supra note 131, at 405. 
163. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 475–76 (“The question whether [Mr.] Apprendi had a constitutional 
right to have a jury find such bias on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is starkly 
presented.” (emphasis added)). 
 164. Compare Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 523 n.11 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[i]t is likewise 
unnecessary to consider whether . . . the rule regarding elements applies to the . . . Guidelines”), with 
id. at 551–52 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (questioning whether after Apprendi, state and federal courts 
should continue to assume the constitutionality of structured sentencing schemes like the Guidelines); 
see also Alex Ricciardulli, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Surprise Ruling on Sentence Enhancements, L.A. 
Law., Feb. 2001, at 15 (noting that “[s]eldom has so big a case [Apprendi] received so little attention” 
and predicting the Guidelines did not implicate Apprendi unless a sentence greater than the maximum 
authorized by statute was imposed). Ricciardulli explains that the Guidelines and other structured 
sentencing laws merely allow increases in sentences within the statutory range and that such increases 
fall within Apprendi’s limiting principle. Id. at 16. “Laws that allow increases beyond a range, on the 
other hand, are in trouble.” See id.; see also Herman, supra note 29, at 296–97, 336–38, 344–45 
(questioning the applicability of McMillan to the issue of the constitutionality of the Guidelines). 
165. Herman, supra note 29, at 337–38, 344–45. 
 166. See, e.g., Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the 
Federal Courts 78–103 (1998) (arguing against limiting sentencing discretion); Michael Tonry, 
Mandatory Minimum Penalties and the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s ‘Mandatory Guidelines’, 4 Fed. 
Sent’g Rep. 129, 132, 133 n.12 (1991) (identifying lack of judicial discretion as a common complaint 
with the Guidelines). 
167. See Saltzburg, supra note 93, at 248, 248 n.19, 251; see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of 
Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 901, 926 (1991) (arguing that 
prosecutors wield too much discretion under guidelines); Bradford C. Mank, Rewarding Defendant 
Cooperation Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Judges vs. Prosecutors, 26 Crim. L. Bull. 399, 
402–04 (1990) (discussing issues resulting from increased prosecutorial discretion); Bascuas, supra note 
80, at 12–13 (comparing shift in role of probation officer as social worker to guidelines range 
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harsher punishment.168 Apprendi supported arguments that structured 
sentencing was a “trial-like enterprise”169 and that McMillian’s 
elements/enhancement distinction violated the Jury Trial Clause.170 
Notable critic of structured sentencing, Professor Douglas Berman, 
argued that the Guidelines failed to provide comprehensive substantive 
and procedural constitutional protections.171 
Notwithstanding critique of the Guidelines by Berman and others, a 
plurality of the Court affirmed McMillan’s elements/enhancements 
distinction in Harris v. United States.172 Harris involved whether 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1)(A) defines a single crime, to which brandishing is a
sentencing factor that may be considered by a judge after the trial, or 
multiple crimes, to which brandishing is an essential element that must 
be proved to a jury.173 Section 924(c)(1)(A)—as amended since Castillo—
provides in relevant part: 
[A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or 
drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm, or who, in 
furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to 
the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking 
crime— 
(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years; 
(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and 
(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment of not less than 10 years.174 
In the indictment, the government neither alleged brandishing nor 
referenced subsection (ii).175 Instead, the indictment charged that Harris 
computator; also discussing change in presentence report from an instrument of potential mercy and 
mitigation to an instrument of inquisition and punishment). 
 168. See Barkow, supra note 117, at 85–87 (arguing that the Guidelines allowed little room to bend the 
law as a matter of justice or equity); see also Klein, supra note 63, at 708; Bascuas, supra note 80, at 37–38. 
 169. See Berman, supra note 94, at 285; Berman, supra note 9, at 396–97; see also Mark 
Chenoweth, Using Its Sixth Sense: The Roberts Court Revamps the Rights of the Accused, 2009 Cato 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 223, 239–40 (discussing Apprendi and concluding that removal of basic fact finding from 
juries violated jury trial rights); Huigens, supra note 114, at 1062, 1069–73 (distinguishing between 
indeterminate and guidelines sentencing, and noting the latter treats “sentencing like an exercise in 
the definition and adjudication of offense elements, so that the sentencing process more and more 
resembles the trial process”). 
 170. Barkow, supra note 117, at 109–12 (arguing that the Guidelines linked facts with punishment 
and that such factual determinations were traditionally made by juries); Berman, supra note 94, at 286 
(“Twentieth century . . . sentencing regimes . . . changed the landscape and have appropriately raised 
Sixth Amendment concerns.”). 
 171. See Berman, supra note 61, at 659–60, 672 (discussing the Guidelines’ lack of procedural 
rules); see also Stith & Cabranes, supra note 166, at 154; Herman, supra note 29, at 315; Thomas W. 
Hutchinson et al., Federal Sentencing Law and Practice § 6A1.3 (1998). 
 172. 536 U.S. 545, 550, 560–61, 568–69 (2002) (reaffirming McMillan and holding that judicial 
factfinding necessary to trigger mandatory minimum penalty does not implicate the Jury Trial Clause). 
173. Id. at 549–50. 
174. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012). 
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knowingly carried a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking 
crime.176 Harris was sentenced to seven years177 based on the finding at 
the sentencing hearing that he brandished a firearm.178 The Fourth 
Circuit ruled brandishing a sentencing factor, as had every other federal 
circuit court to address the question.179 The plurality agreed.180 
The Harris plurality grounded itself on McMillan’s broad grant of 
legislative authority to determine which facts were offense elements and 
which facts were sentencing enhancements.181 The Harris plurality 
acknowledged that section 924(c)(1)(A) did not explicitly designate 
brandishing as an element or sentencing factor, but offered two competing 
interpretations of the statute. Either section 924(c)(1)(A) was structured 
like most federal statutes, which listed the offense elements in a single 
sentence and the separate sentencing factors into subsections.182 Or 
alternatively, Section 924(c)(1)(A) was a statute that appeared to list all 
offense elements in a single sentence but was nevertheless interpreted as 
setting out the elements of multiple offenses.183 The plurality identified two 
“critical textual clues” to distinguish between its two interpretations. First, 
historically Congress had not treated brandishing as an offense element.184 
Second, the two-year increase for brandishing was insignificant.185 
Harris also distinguished McMillian-type facts that increased the 
mandatory minimum sentence from Apprendi-type facts that increased 
the mandatory maximum sentence.186 The plurality denied that there was 
a fundamental inconsistency between Apprendi and McMillian/Harris. 
The Framers would have considered an Apprendi fact an element of an 
aggravated offense and thus the domain of the jury.187 Facts that trigger a 
mandatory minimum sentence, like those at issue in McMillian and 
Harris, cannot claim the same because the jury’s verdict would have 
authorized imposition of the minimum punishment with or without the 




179. Id. at 552–53 (designating brandishing a sentencing factor); see also United States v. Barton, 
257 F.3d 433, 443 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Carlson, 217 F.3d 986, 989 (8th Cir. 2000); United 
States v. Pounds, 230 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 2000). 
180. Harris, 536 U.S. at 552–53. 
181. Id. at 552–56. 
182. Id. at 552–53. 
183. Id. at 553–54. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. at 554–55. The two-year increase was described as “consistent with traditional 
understandings about how sentencing factors operate” and “precisely what one would expect to see in 
provisions meant to identify matters for the sentencing judge’s consideration.” Id. at 546, 554. 
186. Id. at 557–58. 
187. Id. at 557. 
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finding.188 Judicial fact finding in the course of selecting a sentence outside 
the authorized maximum range implicates the Sixth Amendment.189 As 
even Apprendi acknowledges (albeit in a footnote), only increases in the 
penalty above what the law provides function like traditional elements.190 
Thus, only “those facts setting the outer limits of a sentence . . . are 
elements of the crime for the purposes of the constitutional analysis.”191 
Despite Harris, the Court declared that Apprendi applied more 
broadly to state and federal sentencing guidelines. In Blakely v. 
Washington, the Court invalidated a thirty-seven month enhancement 
imposed under state sentencing guidelines for “deliberate cruelty” on the 
grounds that the determination was not made by a jury.192 The next year 
the Court considered whether the Guidelines were unconstitutional.193 In 
United States v. Booker, and its companion case United States v. Fanfan, 
defendants received sentencing enhancements in federal court based on 
amounts of drugs, role in the offense, and obstruction of justice.194 
In separate majority opinions, the Court ruled that the Guidelines 
violated the Apprendi rule, but not fatally so.195 The first Booker majority 
concluded that a jury determination of facts that raised the sentencing 
ceiling was constitutionally protected as a firmly rooted basic precept of 
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 558. 
190. Id. at 562–64 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 487 n.13 (2000) (“We do not 
overrule McMillan. We limit its holding to cases that do not involve the imposition of a sentence more 
severe than the statutory maximum for the offense established by the jury’s verdict.”)). 
191. Harris, 536 U.S. at 567. 
 192. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Washington’s scheme permitted departures from the guidelines minimum 
up to the statutory maximum based on mitigating or aggravating circumstances found by a sentencing 
judge. Kevin R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional Law at Cross-
Purposes, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1082, 1086–89 (2005). All departures must be justified in writing and 
must be found by a preponderance. Id. The Blakely Court reasoned that the relevant “statutory 
maximum” for Apprendi purposes was not the maximum sentence after finding additional facts, but 
the maximum without additional facts. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303. Because the additional facts were 
essential to punishment, they must be found by a jury. Id. at 303–04. The Blakely Court expressly 
declined an invitation to determine whether its ruling implicated the Guidelines. Id. at 305 n.9, 313 
(“The Federal Guidelines are not before us, and we express no opinion on them.”). See generally 
Stephanos Bibas & Susan Klein, The Sixth Amendment and Criminal Sentencing, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 
775, 785 (2008) (discussing state sentencing models and noting a slight majority of states, twenty-nine, 
were unaffected by Blakely or Booker); Fisher, supra note 126, at 56–57 (discussing legal basis for 
argument that Washington’s sentencing guidelines undermined the Framers’ design); Klein, supra note 
63, at 709–12; Berman, supra note 61, at 674. 
193. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
194. Booker received enhancements for obstructing justice and possession of an additional 566 grams 
of crack. Id. at 226–28. Fanfan’s jury found 500 or more grams of cocaine were involved. Id. at 228–29. 
The sentencing court found Fanfan responsible for 2.5 kilograms of cocaine powder and 261.6 grams of 
crack. Id. Fanfan was also found to have played a leadership role in the criminal activity. Id. 
 195. See id. at 244–45, 258–62; see also Timothy Lynch, One Cheer for United States v. Booker, 
2005 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 215, 216 (describing the Booker oral argument as a direct reflection of the Court’s 
unreadiness to “untangle the knots that presently encumber[ed] the constitutional right to trial by jury”). 
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the common law.196 This majority distinguished between mandatory and 
advisory sentencing models for Sixth Amendment purposes. Mandatory 
guidelines implicated the Jury Trial Clause197—advisory guidelines did 
not.198 The first Booker majority agreed with Blakely that the statutory 
maximum for Apprendi purposes was “the maximum sentence a judge 
may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or 
admitted by the defendant.”199 The Jury Trial Clause was violated to the 
extent that the Guidelines required judicial fact finding at sentencing 
hearings. The second Booker majority focused on whether the 
Guidelines could be remedied.200 Exercising its power of severability, the 
Court ruled that the mandatory nature of the Guidelines made them 
incompatible with the U.S. Constitution.201 Advisory guidelines and a 
reasonableness standard of appellate review cured these 
incompatibilities.202 The Court reinforced the Apprendi rule during the 
2012 term in Southern Union Company v. United States203 by holding that 
the Jury Trial Clause applied to criminal fines.204 
In 2013, the Court reconsidered the Harris plurality’s distinction 
between mandatory minimum and maximum sentences in Alleyne v. 
United States.205 Alleyne involved the same federal criminal statute at 
issue in Harris, section 924(c)(1)(A), and asked the same question as 
Harris, whether brandishing under subsection (ii) was an essential 
element or a sentencing enhancement.206 Alleyne was convicted of one 
count of robbery affecting interstate commerce and one count of using or 
carrying a firearm during a crime of violence.207 Alleyne was also charged 
with brandishing a firearm under subsection (ii)208 but the jury did not 
196. Booker, 543 U.S. at 230. 
 197. Id. at 233 (reasoning that if the federal Guidelines were advisory, there would be no Sixth 
Amendment implications). 
198. Id. at 233 (“[W]hen a judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence . . . the 
defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant.”). 
199. Id. at 232 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004)). 
200. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244–45. 
201. Id. at 258. 
202. Id. at 261–63. 
203. 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012). 
204. Id. at 2348–49. Southern Union Company involved the imposition of a $38.1 million fine under 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (the “RCRA”), which set a maximum fine of 
$50,000 per day of violation. Id. At the sentencing, the district court found that Southern Union violated 
the RCRA for 762 days; the jury was not asked to determine the precise duration of the violation. Id. at 
2349. The First Circuit ruled Apprendi did not apply to criminal fines, creating a split among the circuits. 
Id. (citing United States v. Pfaff, 619 F.3d 172 (2nd Cir. 2010) (per curiam); United States v. LaGrou 
Distribution Sys., Inc., 466 F.3d 585 (7th Cir. 2006)). The Court disagreed and held there was no 
principled basis rooted in longstanding common law practice to treat criminal fines differently than other 
forms of punishment where Apprendi applies. S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2350–57. 
205. 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013). 
206. Id. 
207. Id. at 2155–56. 
208. Id. 
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find Alleyne guilty of that offense.209 At sentencing, the district court 
imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of seven years based on the 
finding that by a preponderance of the evidence Alleyne could have 
reasonably foreseen that his accomplice would brandish a firearm.210 The 
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the post-verdict finding that brandishing 
occurred.211 
The Alleyne Court ruled that Apprendi encompassed “not only facts 
that increase the ceiling, but also those that increase the floor.”212 Alleyne 
is premised on the “clear” relationship at common law between crime and 
punishment.213 Additionally, in the common law substantive criminal law 
tended to be sanction specific. In other words, a particular sentence was 
prescribed for a particular offense.214 Alleyne reasoned that at common 
law the “legally prescribed” penalty affixed to the crime included both 
ends of the punishment range.215 It followed that any fact that triggered 
both the mandatory (or statutory) maximum and minimum sentence 
were “ingredient[s]” of the offense.216 Elevating the low-end or “floor” of 
a sentencing range heightened “the loss of liberty associated with the 
crime”217 and is as relevant as the high-end or “ceiling.”218 Apprendi’s 
foundation is to ensure that a defendant can “predict the legally 
applicable penalty from the face of the indictment.”219 In the Alleyne 
Court’s view, expanding Apprendi to include facts necessary to increase 
the mandatory minimum sentence allows a defendant to do so.220 
Alleyne acknowledges that judicial fact finding at felony sentencing 
is a post-Founding development.221 At the time of the Founding, little 
judicial discretion existed to influence felony punishment. Offense 
conduct that merited punishment was determined during the trial and 
sentencing only consisted of announcing the judgment. Modern 
bifurcation of the trial and sentencing stages of the criminal prosecution 
has shifted fact finding on offense conduct (and to a lesser extent 
offender characteristics) into a structured sentencing hearing. Once guilt 
is accepted (either as a result of a trial or a plea), sentencing becomes the 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 2156. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. at 2158. 
213. Id. 
214. See id.; see also John H. Langbein, The English Criminal Trial Jury on the Eve of the French 
Revolution, in The Trial Jury in England, France, Germany 1700–1900, at 36 (Antonio Padoa 
Schioppa ed., 1987). 
215. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2160. 
216. Id. at 2160–61. 
217. Id. at 2161. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. at 2163–64. 
221. Id. at 2173 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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focus of all parties. Mempa establishes felony sentencing as a critical stage 
of the criminal prosecution for which counsel is necessary. Apprendi and 
its progeny, as most recently demonstrated in Alleyne, establish that the 
jury’s fact finding role also extends beyond the trial stage of the criminal 
prosecution. 
III. Unbranding the Confrontation Clause as Only a Trial
Right  
This Part proposes uniform application at felony sentencing of the 
Sixth Amendment’s structurally identical Counsel, Jury Trial, and 
Confrontation Clauses. I advocate eliminating the “trial-right-only” theory 
of the Confrontation Clause to allow cross-examination of testimonial 
statements that are material to punishment and where cross-examination 
assists in assessing truth. 
The trial-right-only rule has endured longer in Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence than both Counsel and Jury Trial Clause jurisprudence. 
Three years after ratification of the Sixth Amendment, a North Carolina 
court of equity expressed one of the earliest interpretations of the 
confrontation right in State v. Webb:222 “[I]t is a rule of the common law, 
founded on natural justice, that no man shall be prejudiced by evidence 
which he had not the liberty to cross examine.”223 Over the next century, 
state and federal courts retreated from Webb and confrontation became 
linked with hearsay rules.224 By the late twentieth century, confrontation 
and hearsay rules were generally thought to arise from the same due 
process origins and serve the same purposes of trustworthiness and 
reliability.225 
Circuit courts that have ruled that confrontation rights do not apply 
at felony sentencing226 rely primarily on Barber v. Page227 and Mancusi v. 
Stubbs.228 Barber succinctly states, “[t]he right to confrontation is 
222. 2 N.C. 103 (1 Hayw. 103) (1794). 
223. Id. at 104. 
224. Compare Johnston v. State, 10 Tenn. 58, 59–60 (2 Yer. 58) (1821) (holding that because the 
witness died before trial, reading of deposition testimony into evidence did not violate confrontation 
principles) and Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 239–44 (1895) (holding that deceased witness 
was sufficiently unavailable for trial for purposes of hearsay exception), with Motes v. United States, 
178 U.S. 458, 471–75 (1900) (holding admission at trial of statements made at preliminary hearing 
violated the Confrontation Clause due to an insufficient showing of unavailability). See generally 
Goldsby v. United States, 160 U.S. 70, 73 (1895) (holding that the failure to conduct a preliminary 
examination of the accused did not result in a confrontation violation). 
 225. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (stating it is a “truism that ‘hearsay rules and the 
Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values,’ and ‘stem from the same 
roots.’” (internal citations omitted)); see also Fenner, supra note 21, at 37. 
226. See supra note 2. 
227. 390 U.S. 719 (1968). 
228. 408 U.S. 204 (1972). 
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basically a trial right,”229 but Barber was not a felony sentencing case.230 
Neither was Mancusi, although the ruling in that case affected Stubbs’s 
punishment. Stubbs was convicted and sentenced under New York’s 
second offender law based in part on a Tennessee murder conviction that 
had been overturned due to the denial of effective counsel.231 The New 
York court admitted witness statements from the prior Tennessee trial 
over Stubbs’s objection.232 The Mancusi Court found that there was 
sufficient evidence that the testimony of the unavailable Tennessee 
witness was reliable.233 Thus, the overturned Tennessee murder 
conviction could be counted as the predicate offense under New York’s 
second offender law. 
Barber and Mancusi rely heavily on the assumption that 
confrontation has always enjoyed a peaceful coexistence with hearsay 
rules.234 Barber and Mancusi were decided at a time when literal 
application of the Confrontation Clause was rejected for fear of abrogating 
most of the hearsay exceptions.235 Both cases turn on the prosecution’s 
good faith showing of unavailability and defendant’s prior opportunity to 
cross-examine the witness.236 Barber and Mancusi upheld the erroneous 
principle that because confrontation and hearsay were rooted in due 
process,237 reliability was a sufficient surrogate238 for cross-examination at 
trial.239 Ohio v. Roberts best articulates that principle: 
[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at 
trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is 
unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears 
adequate “indicia of reliability.” Reliability can be inferred without 
more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay 
exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least 
absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.240 
229. Barber, 390 U.S. at 725. 
 230. Barber objected at trial to the admission of un-cross-examined preliminary hearing testimony. 
Id. at 720–21. The Court granted habeas relief on the ground that state authorities failed to make good 
faith efforts to obtain the witness. Id. at 724–26. 
231. Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 207–10. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. at 216. 
234. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65–66 (1990). But see California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155–56 
(1970) (warning against the assumption that the overlap between hearsay rules and the Confrontation 
Clause is complete or the assumption that confrontation rights are nothing more than a codification of 
hearsay rules and their exceptions). 
235. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63. 
236. Id. at 65–77. 
237. Id. at 66. 
238. Chhablani, supra note 10, at 514 (citing John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real 
Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Examination, and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
191, 206 (1999)). 
239. United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707, 711–12 (1978). 
240. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
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Like Barber and Mancusi, Roberts established that the Confrontation 
Clause reflected only a “preference for face-to-face confrontation at 
trial.”241 Roberts was arrested and charged with forgery and possession of 
stolen credit cards.242 At trial, Roberts testified that Anita Isaacs, the 
daughter of the victims,243 provided the checkbook and credit cards with 
the understanding that he was allowed to use them.244 Upon questioning 
by defense counsel at the preliminary hearing Isaacs admitted that she 
knew Roberts and that she permitted Roberts to stay at her apartment 
for several days while she was away, but that she neither gave Roberts 
her parents’ checks and credit cards nor granted him permission to use 
them.245 Because Isaacs did not appear at trial,246 the prosecution was 
allowed to admit her preliminary hearing transcript to rebut Roberts’s 
testimony.247 While acknowledging that the Confrontation Clause was 
intended to limit some hearsay, the Roberts Court affirmed Mancusi and 
Barber to the extent that where a witness was unavailable, the 
confrontation requirement was satisfied by hearsay that was reliable and 
trustworthy.248 The Court found that the prosecution made a good faith 
showing of unavailability and that Roberts had an adequate opportunity 
to cross-examine Isaacs during the preliminary hearing.249 
Roberts, Mancusi, and Barber are incompatible outliers from the 
Court’s more recent interpretations of the Confrontation Clause, 
beginning with Crawford v. Washington.250 Crawford involved the 
admission of pre-recorded testimonial statements by a wife against her 
 241. See id. at 63–64 (emphasis added); see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846, 849 (1990) 
(reasoning that the primary purpose of confrontation is to ensure reliability and face-to-face 
confrontation is only a preference). 
242. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58. 
 243. The checks were in the name of Barnard Isaacs and the stolen credit cards belong to both 
Barnard and his wife, Amy. Id. 
244. Id. at 59. 
245. Id. at 58. According to the Court, defense counsel neither asked to have Isaacs declared a 
hostile witness nor requested permission cross-examine her. Id. 
 246. Id. at 59–60. Five subpoenas for four different trial dates were sent to Isaacs at her parents’ 
Ohio residence. Id. at 59. Anita was not present upon execution, nor did she contact the court. Id. 
Before admission of the transcript, the trial judge conducted a voir dire of Isaacs’s mother who 
testified she infrequently received telephone calls and knew of no emergency contact information for 
her daughter. Id. at 59–60. 
 247. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the prosecution failed to make a good faith 
showing of unavailability. Id. at 60. The court of appeals noted the state’s failure to seek Isaacs’s 
whereabouts for purposes of trial or otherwise determine whether she could be found. Id. The Ohio 
Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s finding on availability, but held that Roberts was not 
afforded a constitutionally sufficient opportunity to cross-examine Isaacs at the preliminary hearing. 
Id. at 60–61. The Ohio Supreme Court reasoned that increased due diligence would not have procured 
Isaacs’s attendance at trial because her whereabouts were entirely unknown, but that defense 
counsel’s questioning at the preliminary hearing did not amount to a cross-examination. Id. 
248. Id. at 65–67. 
249. Id. at 74–77. 
250. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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husband, the defendant, and against whom she could not testify based on 
spousal privilege.251 The Washington Supreme Court had previously 
affirmed admission of Mrs. Crawford’s recorded statements, satisfied 
that they were both reliable and trustworthy.252 The Crawford Court 
reversed and reasoned that hearsay rules have strayed too far from 
confrontation’s “original meaning.”253 
Crawford recognized two historical inferences about the Founders’ 
understanding of confrontation: first, the Confrontation Clause was 
intended to prohibit ex parte examinations as evidence against the 
accused;254 second, preratification testimonial statements of absent 
witnesses would not have been allowed without a showing of unavailability 
and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.255 The Crawford Court 
ruled that the due process standard was too unpredictable.256 
Confrontation standards were higher: “Where testimonial statements are 
at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional 
demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”257 
The Court ultimately found that Mrs. Crawford’s statements closely 
paralleled those the Framers intended to regulate258 and that the 
admission of those statements violated Mr. Crawford’s confrontation 
rights.259 Noting that “testimonial statements” can be used for purposes 
other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted,260 the Court 
251. Id. at 38–40. 
 252. Id. at 41. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed and found that Mrs. Crawford’s 
statements contradicted previous statements made in response to specific questions and that at one 
point Mrs. Crawford admitted she closed her eyes during the incident for which her husband was on 
trial. Id. 
253. Id. at 60. But see Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know 
It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 Brook. L. Rev. 105, 120–89, 196–206 (2005) 
(questioning the historical accuracy of Crawford’s reasoning that cross-examination and unavailability 
would have been required at the time of the Founding, as well as the use of non-testimonial 
statements; also arguing that Crawford glossed over important distinctions between felony and 
misdemeanor procedure and that at the Founding, the law had yet to fully develop hearsay rules or 
their exceptions). 
254. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50. 
255. Id. at 53–54. 
256. Id. at 60–67 (examining and discussing inconsistencies in the application of hearsay rules in 
post-Roberts confrontation cases). 
 257. See id. at 68–69; see also id. at 61 (“Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is 
fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation . . . [which] . . . reflects a judgment . . . about how 
reliability can be best determined.”). 
 258. See id. at 52 (concluding statements taken by police officers in the course of “interrogations 
bear a striking resemblance to examinations by justices of the peace in England”); see also Fisher, 
supra note 126, at 59 (describing Crawford as a “thoroughgoing originalist opinion”). 
 259. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53. The Court found the absence of an oath and the fact that the 
interrogators were police officers irrelevant. Id. 
260. Id. at 59 n.9 (citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985)). 
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explicitly limited the scope of the Confrontation Clause to “witnesses 
against the accused” who “bear testimony.”261 
Crawford’s interpretation of the Confrontation Clause applied only to 
testimonial statements; non-testimonial statements did not require more 
than reliability.262 Davis v. Washington clarified the distinction between 
testimonial and non-testimonial statements.263 Davis involved the 
admissibility of statements of unavailable witnesses in unrelated criminal 
trials in Washington state and Indiana. The Washington courts concluded 
that statements made in response to questions from 911 operator who 
answered a victim’s call about a domestic dispute were non-testimonial 
and admissible.264 The Indiana courts disagreed about admission of a 
victim affidavit that was executed and given to law enforcement officers 
who responded to a domestic disturbance complaint at the victim’s 
home.265 Davis held that statements were testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicated that no ongoing emergency existed and 
that the primary purpose of the interrogation (or questioning) was to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to a subsequent criminal 
prosecution.266 Statements are non-testimonial, however, when given in 
the course of an interrogation (or questioning) and where circumstances 
objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
assist police during an ongoing emergency.267 
Crawford makes clear that actual confrontation and cross-
examination are the best methods to test the veracity of testimonial 
statements, and Davis demonstrates the fluidity of the testimonial/non-
testimonial distinction.268 As confrontation speaks to the method of 
261. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
262. Id. at 68. 
263. 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
264. Id. at 818–19. In the call, the defendant’s ex-girlfriend provided defendant’s name and accused 
him of assault. Id. at 817–18. The defendant was present during this portion of the call. Id. After 
informing the operator that the defendant left the scene, the victim described the context of the assault 
and provided other identifying information about the defendant. Id. at 818. 
 265. Id. at 819–21. Officers found the victim alone on her front porch; she later gave permission for 
them to enter the home where the defendant, her husband was waiting in the kitchen. Id. at 819. After 
questioning the victim in her living room, officers provided an affidavit which she filled out and signed. 
Id. at 819–20. One officer remained in the kitchen with the defendant, who attempted to participate in 
the conversation. Id. 
266. Id. at 822. 
267. Id.  
 268. Id. (noting that while in Crawford a core class of testimonial statements were set forth, it was 
“unnecessary to endorse any of them, because ‘some statements qualify under any definition’”) 
(citation omitted). The Davis Court reasoned that “[w]ell into the 20th century . . . Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence was carefully applied only in the testimonial context.” Id. at 824–25 (citations 
omitted). The testimonial character of the statement separated it from other hearsay that was subject 
to traditional limitations barring admission, but not the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 821. Statements 
taken by police officers in the course of interrogations were considered to be in the core class of 
testimonial statements. Id. 
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testing evidence, the rules governing the method of testing could easily 
apply at felony sentencing, and already leave vast room for judicial 
discretion.269 The Guidelines place no limitations on the use of information 
concerning the background, character, and conduct of a convicted 
defendant.270 Sentencing courts can reach far back in time to determine 
what conduct relates to the defendant’s convicted offense.271 This 
evidence may include statements recorded by probation officers during 
telephone interviews or signed witness statements gathered by law 
enforcement or prosecutors.272 Such reports and statements are likely to 
include hearsay, double hearsay, and triple hearsay.273 During plea 
negotiations, defense counsel may be unaware which testimonial 
statements, if any, will be presented at sentencing. Moreover, there is 
usually little opportunity to investigate the statement’s veracity once its 
materiality becomes apparent. Despite these serious implications, 
reliability is the current standard to test information presented at felony 
sentencing hearings.274 
Testing the veracity of testimonial statements that are material to 
punishment is as compelling at felony sentencing as Crawford and Davis 
recognize at trial. Originally, the purpose of trial was to establish the 
specific offense conduct that merited punishment.275 The purpose of 
sentencing was to announce the punishment.276 Little judicial discretion 
 269. But see Becker, supra note 7, at 2 (warning that the combination of guidelines sentencing and 
expansive judicial discretion may cause serious adverse consequences to defendants). 
270. Ngov, supra note 6, at 267 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2012)); Becker, supra note 7, at 2 n.6. 
271. Ngov, supra note 6, at 237–38. 
272. See United States v. O’Meara, 895 F.2d 1216, 1223 (8th Cir. 1990) (“[I]t is a sad but true fact 
of life under the Guidelines that many of the crucial judgment calls in sentencing are now made, not 
by the court, but by probation officers.”) (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also 
John S. Dierna, Guideline Sentencing: Probation Officer Responsibilities and Interagency Issues, 
53 Fed. Probation 3, 3 (1989). In the federal regime, probation officers play a critical role as the 
court’s independent investigator. Id. Probation officers prepare all sections of the presentence report 
provided to the judge, including the tentative advisory guideline range based on the information 
gathered during the investigation. See id.; see also Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge’s Second 
Impression of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 357, 364 (1992); Becker, supra note 
7, at 8. 
273. Becker, supra note 7, at 161. 
 274. Use of acquitted conduct as a category of “relevant conduct” essentially second-guesses a jury’s 
prior determination about the veracity of testimonial statements. Despite the jury’s declaration of “legal 
innocence,” federal courts permit use of acquitted conduct to increase punishment. Ngov, supra note 6, at 
258–60 nn.142–50, 284, 287 (discussing impact of acquitted conduct on subsequent proceedings, including 
probation and parole revocation hearings). Thus, in some cases, “a defendant can be sentenced to the 
same length of imprisonment that would have been imposed had he actually been convicted of the 
offense.” Id. at 242. But see Blackstone, supra note 30, at *361–62 (“If the jury therefore find the 
prisoner not guilty, he is then for ever [sic] quit and discharged of the accusation.”). The prosecution is 
given a “second bite at the apple” to prove conduct already rejected as punishable, allowing the 
sentencing judge to ignore the jury’s previous findings. Ngov, supra note 6, at 261, 267, 288, 291. 
275. White, supra note 29, at 397. 
276. See id.; see also Becker, supra note 7, at 5–6. 
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existed pre-Founding to influence felony sentencing.277 Modern 
sentencing procedure developed post-Founding and has shifted fact 
finding for purposes of fixing punishment into a structured sentencing 
hearing that occurs independent of the trial.278 Once guilt is rendered, 
either as a result of a verdict or a plea, sentencing becomes the focus of 
all parties and an accurate determination of facts that influence the 
sentence should be of primary importance for all parties.279 
Apprendi warned that modern courts must adhere to constitutional 
principles280 even though the practice of unitary trial and sentencing may 
have changed. Alleyne provides a timely reminder of Apprendi’s 
warning. Alleyne’s vigorous (and successful) defense of the brandishing 
“element” was essentially rendered meaningless.281 The Guidelines 
allowed reconsideration of Alleyne’s acquitted conduct, specifically the 
brandishing charge, as a category of “relevant conduct.”282 Alleyne’s 
sentencing court allowed the prosecution to re-allege brandishing as an 
“enhancement” and therefore prove it by a lower burden. Alleyne was 
punished as if the jury actually found brandishing.283 For the Alleyne 
Court, the inherent unfairness of these procedures, from a sentencing 
prospective, were no trivial matter and quite troubling.284 So too is that 
fact that defense counsel was not allowed use of the most effective tools 
to re-defend the allegation, namely cross-examination of the testimonial 
statements that supported the post-trial “finding” that brandishing 
occurred. 
277. Blackstone, supra note 30, *378. 
 278. McMurray, supra note 23, at 592; Douglass, supra note 28, at 1972; Becker, supra note 7, at 6–
7 (describing guidelines sentencing as thoroughly fact driving). 
279. Becker, supra note 7, at 2. 
280. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483–84 (2000). But see id. at 518 (describing decision as 
a return to a status quo that reflected the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment, not as a sharp 
break from the past) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 281. Ngov, supra note 6, at 261, 267, 288, 291 (arguing that it would be impossible for innocence to 
have any significance if the sentencing court is allowed to use acquitted conduct to increase the 
sentence; that there should be new evidence to warrant or justify a court’s reconsideration of acquitted 
conduct; and that such an outcome is nonsensical and in contravention of recent Supreme Court Jury 
Trial Clause precedent, including Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker). 
282. Id. at 267 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2012)). 
 283. See id. at 258–60 nn.142–50, 242, 284; see also, id. at 287. (discussing impact of acquitted 
conduct on subsequent proceedings, including probation and revocation hearings). The Court 
addressed the use of acquitted conduct as a basis for punishment in a pre-Crawford per curiam opinion 
that held use of such information did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. United States v. Watts, 
519 U.S. 148, 155 (1997) (“[A]n acquittal is not a finding of any fact. . . . Without specific jury findings, 
no one can logically or realistically draw any factual inferences.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Even if acquittals only mean that the reasonable doubt standard was not met, not that the defendant is 
actually innocent, reconsideration of acquitted conduct is inherently unfair. Ngov, supra note 6, at 242 
(citing Barry L. Johnson, If at First You Don’t Succeed—Abolishing the Use of Acquitted Conduct in 
Guidelines Sentencing, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 153, 182–83 (1996)). 
284. See Ngov, supra note 6, at 242 (citing Johnson, supra note 283, at 182–83). 
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Due to the prevalence of plea bargaining, most cases do not result in 
a trial like in Alleyne. As a result, the resolution of the material facts 
constituting the offense occurs after the plea and usually requires the use 
of testimonial statements at sentencing.285 In this manner, the sentencing 
hearing itself becomes quite similar to a trial but results in sentencing by 
ambush from the defendant’s perspective.286 The inability to cross-
examine testimonial statements ties defense counsel’s hands and leaves 
the defendant with no meaningful opportunity to test the material 
evidence that supports the punishment.287 Counsel’s ability to marshal 
and prove the facts, introduce evidence, and generally aid and assist the 
defendant is also significantly hindered.288 Allowing cross-examination of 
testimonial statements to prove the sentencing offense lessens the risk 
that the defendant will be punished based on unreliable evidence.289 
This is not to say that confrontation should be required for all felony 
sentencing information.290 Instead, when determining whether to require 
cross-examination of testimonial statements at felony sentencing, two 
key factors are the statement’s materiality to punishment and whether 
cross-examination will assist in assessing veracity or truth. Determining 
whether testimonial statements would assist in an assessment of truth is 
unnecessary where material facts about the sentencing offense are 
admitted by the defendant and entered into the record (or plea 
agreement) at the time the plea is accepted. At the sentencing, the trial 
judge can ascertain a defendant’s knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
acceptance of the statement’s veracity in the same manner as the court 
establishes the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary acknowledgement or 
waiver of other constitutional rights at sentencing. Where the parties do 
not agree, cross-examination should be allowed at felony sentencing. 
Conclusion 
An accurate determination of the facts that support the punishment is 
primary to the integrity of the U.S. criminal justice system. Bifurcated trial 
and sentencing is a modern felony sentencing development, but 
constitutional principles must still be obeyed. The fundamental unfairness 
and prejudice associated with punishing a defendant based on un-cross-
examined testimonial statements provides sufficient reason to unbrand 
 285. James Edward Bond, Plea Bargaining and Guilty Pleas 156–57 (1975) (noting that 
sentencing judges rarely make detailed inquiries regarding the factual basis for the plea before 
accepting it). 
286. See Becker, supra note 7, at 7–10. 
287. See id. at 9. 
288. See id. at 8. 
289. Id. at 19 (describing the Confrontation Clause as the obvious candidate to ensure basic 
fairness at sentencing proceedings). 
 290. In State v. Hurt, 616 S.E.2d 910 (N.C. 2005), the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected the trial-
right-only theory of confrontation rights and recognized the pivotal role of counsel at modern sentencing. 
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confrontation as a right that only applies at the trial stage of the criminal 
prosecution. Crawford and Davis make clear that actual confrontation 
and cross-examination are the best methods to assess the veracity of 
testimonial statements.291 Eliminating the “trial-right-only” theory of the 
Confrontation Clause creates uniformity with the structurally identical 
Counsel and Jury Trial Clauses. To be sure, confrontation should not be 
required for all evidence presented at felony sentencing hearings. Two key 
factors when determining whether to require cross-examination of 
testimonial statements at felony sentencing are the statement’s materiality 
to punishment and whether cross-examination will assist in assessing truth. 
Where both prongs of this inquiry are met, confrontation should be 
expanded through the sentencing stage of the felony prosecution. 
 291. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 825–26 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 
69 (2004). 
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